Capacity Constraints and the Job Guarantee by Mitchell, William & Watts, Martin
  
 
 
Working Paper No. 04-13 
 
 
Capacity constraints and the Job Guarantee 
William Mitchell and Martin Watts1 
November 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre of Full Employment and Equity 
The University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308, Australia 
Home Page: http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee 
Email: coffee@newcastle.edu.au 
 
 
  
  2 
We have the resources in terms of idle manpower and idle plants to do so 
much, while the preachers of austerity, most of whom are in little danger of 
themselves suffering any serious consequences, keep telling us to tighten our 
belts and refrain from using the resources that lie idle all around us - William 
Vickrey (2000: 5). 
1. Introduction 
The efficacy of the Job Guarantee (JG) as a strategy for sustained full employment 
has been the subject of ongoing debate between its advocates, who typically align 
themselves with the principles of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), and other 
heterodox economists. The latter group includes Lopez-Gallardo (2000), 
Aspromourgos (2000), Kadmos and O’Hara (2000), King (2001), Ramsey (2002-03), 
Sawyer (2003, 2005) and Seccareccia (2004) who have raised issues, including the 
stabilisation of inflation, balance of payments constraints, political and intellectual 
constraints, invisible under-employment, and the sustainability of full employment. 
Their critiques have been considered in detail in Mitchell (1998), Mitchell and Mosler 
(2002), Mitchell and Watts (2003), Mitchell and Wray (2005), Mitchell and Muysken 
(2008) 
The focus of this paper is on the achievement and maintenance of full employment 
through the adoption of a JG in comparison to pump priming, which is advocated by a 
number of economists, including Sawyer (2003, 2005). In particular, it is generally 
recognised that a reduced rate of growth of capacity during a recession can cause 
capacity constrained unemployment in the recovery which would be exacerbated if 
there was a significant pro-cyclical labour supply response, in addition to labour force 
increases driven by the rising working age population (see, for example, Malinvaud, 
1980; Mitchell and Muysken, 2002 and Arestis and Sawyer, 2005). Consequently an 
expansion in spending may have an insignificant real effect on employment and 
output and is likely to impact on inflation. In other words, the real output gap, which 
relief from the high unemployment is defined as the actual level of output minus 
potential output associated with the full utilisation of existing capacity, is not large 
enough to allow all the unemployed to gain productive jobs in the private sector.  
We shall argue that, while private sector investment, which is governed by 
profitability considerations, may be insufficient to expand potential output sufficiently 
in a recovery to re-absorb the unemployed who lost their jobs in the downturn, this 
contention does not apply to a currency-issuing government which introduces a JG. 
While a major planning exercise is required, when the JG is first implemented, which 
must address the prevailing rate of labour underutilisation, the creation of additional 
JG jobs simultaneously creates the extra productive capacity required for program 
viability. On the other hand, the prospective fluctuations in JG employment arising 
from the fluctuations in non-government employment are likely to be relatively 
modest within a fully employed economy, which makes the planning process less 
challenging. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly explore the theoretical 
literature about capacity constrained unemployment, by particular reference to 
Malinvaud (1980), Mitchell and Muysken (2002) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005), and 
also note the empirical evidence about the slow growth of potential output since the 
GFC in the OECD countries (OECD, 2009) and the USA (Reifschneider et al., 2013). 
The concept of fiscal space is explored in Section 3. We then highlight the difficulties 
of achieving and sustaining full employment through pump priming and show that the 
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arguments about capacity constrained unemployment have no relevance to the 
implementation of a JG, but we acknowledge the major planning issues are entailed, 
particularly in the initial implementation of the JG. Concluding comments complete 
the paper. 
2. Capacity constrained unemployment 
2.1 Theoretical perspectives 
Edmond Malinvaud presented the Marshall Lectures at Cambridge University in 
1978, which culminated in his 1980 book entitled Profitability and Unemployment. 
He was contributing to a robust debate about the rising unemployment rates around 
the world, following the OPEC oil shocks and the contractionary fiscal response by 
governments to the ensuing rise in inflation. 
Aggregate demand and income rationing in a monetary economy will impact on the 
product and labour markets. Thus, consumers in aggregate could receive a level of 
income, which was constrained by involuntary unemployment, and, in turn, firms 
would face constrained sales due to a lack of demand. Malinvaud argued that it was 
possible that there would be insufficient capacity after a recession to enable workers 
who were involuntarily unemployed to be re-engaged in the productive workforce, 
following an increase in demand. In other words, in the terminology used at the time, 
the unemployment was neither Classical nor Keynesian, even it had originated as one 
of these causal categories. Instead, the unemployment was a consequence of low 
investment during and after a recession, which reduced the growth of capacity. Thus, 
following a recession, mass unemployment could persist and be capacity constrained, 
rather than demand-constrained or Keynesian. Malinvaud showed that even with real 
wage flexibility (the Classical case), mass unemployment could persist under these 
circumstances. 
Firms will not invest unless they expect the new productive capacity will generate an 
acceptable rate of return, which is defined simply as being positive in Malinvaud’s 
model. He defines a probability distribution for actual output defined as the minimum 
of real demand and the level of output associated with the full employment of labour. 
The expected net returns are expressed in terms of the expected gross returns 
associated with actual output, taking labour costs into account, minus the cost of the 
provision of a specific level of capacity, which incorporates a unit capacity cost. The 
maximisation of expected returns yields an optimal level of capacity. His model is 
more coherent if the capital equipment is rented, so that unit capacity cost has a clear 
meaning. His resulting linear investment function has major deficiencies, which he 
acknowledges (Malinvaud, 1980: 29-37). Notwithstanding these modelling issues, 
Malinvaud was an early developer of the notion of capacity constrained 
unemployment, albeit in a static framework. 
Mitchell and Muysken (2002) argue that firms form expectations of future 
profitability by considering the current capacity utilisation rate against their normal 
usage. They will only invest when capacity utilisation, exceeds its normal level. They 
will hire extra labour to work on the new capacity to produce the output necessary to 
satisfy the expected increase in demand. Thus, investment varies with capacity 
utilisation and productive capacity grows at rate, which is bounded from below, and 
above. The asymmetric investment behaviour thus generates asymmetries in capacity 
growth because productive capacity only grows when there is a shortage of capacity. 
The authors developed a model based on the notion that investors face endemic 
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uncertainty when making large irreversible capital outlays, which leads them to be 
cautious and to use broad safety margins in times of pessimism. Also any new 
investment is likely to have a lagged effect on new capacity, since investment takes 
time. In addition, to the extent that real wages have declined during the recession, 
recovery will be more modest and the inducement to invest may well be weaker, due 
to lower capacity utilisation, thereby slowing the economic recovery.  
Thus firms will be reluctant to invest in new productive capacity in the early stages of 
recovery if they are unsure that the demand growth will be robust and enduring and 
capable of supporting the extra productive capacity. It is thus entirely possible that the 
private sector can become capacity-constrained, which limits the scope for private 
sector employment expansion in the short-run after a deep recession. Mitchell and 
Muysken (2002, 2008) tie this model into the concept of hysteresis, where potential 
real output falls in a lagged fashion with declining real GDP is also consistent with 
this conclusion. The longer a recession is allowed to endure the greater will be the 
impact of these hysteretic forces. This type of model stands up very well to empirical 
scrutiny. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2005) develop a structuralist model of inflation, which 
incorporates three key features: (a) ‘[o]ne set of inflationary pressures comes from the 
level of demand relative to the size of productive capacity’; (b) a second set of 
pressures arises from the ‘inherent conflict over the distribution of income’; and (c) 
aggregate demand determines the level of economic activity and there is no 
expectation that ‘the level of demand will generate full employment of labour and/or 
full capacity utilisation’. 
They conclude from their analysis that:  (a) productive capacity and hence investment 
impacts on the NAIRU (inflation barrier), which consequently exhibits hysteresis; (b) 
investment which depends on capacity utilisation and profitability, is also influenced 
by aggregate demand; and (c) changes in labour market flexibility have a minimal 
effect on the inflation barrier (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005: 966-67). The authors 
approvingly quote Dow (1998) on the ‘effects of recession on the future capital stock 
and thereby on future employment prospects’. Dow finds that enterprises adjust their 
capital stock to the prevailing level of aggregate demand and level of employment. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2005: 968) write that: 
High levels of unemployment and excess capacity can be expected to have led 
to a substantial reduction in the capital stock to below what it would have been 
if there had been sustained full employment, and on the basis of the argument 
developed above, the increase in the inflation barrier would be 
correspondingly substantial. 
Their structuralist model is consistent with the arguments developed by Malinvaud 
(1980) and Mitchell and Muysken (2002). 
2.2 Empirical work 
OECD (2009) acknowledged that the real crisis post-GFC had led to a downward 
revision in the level of OECD potential output of about 2 per cent by the end of 2010, 
with the medium term forecast being a decline of 2.75 per cent, although the long-
term potential growth rate was allegedly unaffected. Two thirds of the short-term 
decline in potential output growth was attributed to the ‘collapse in investment and 
the associated slower growth of capital input to production’ (OECD, 2009: 213). 
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Following a deep recession, the rise in unemployment would be partially translated 
into higher structural unemployment (and lower potential output) via rising long-term 
unemployment and hysteresis effects, but ‘hysteresis effects are asymmetric in the 
sense that they tend to raise the NAIRU when unemployment rises, but do not lower 
the NAIRU when unemployment falls’ (OECD 2009: 230). 
However, rather than highlighting the capacity constraints which would frustrate a 
recovery in employment and emphasising the need to engender buoyant expectations 
to promote new investment, OECD (2009: 214) argued that ‘accelerating structural 
reforms in the years ahead would not only improve longer term growth prospects and 
enhance resilience to new adverse shocks, but would also contribute to easing fiscal 
pressures.’ Thus, by exaggerating the impact of the deep recession on potential 
output, via an asymmetric hysteretic process, the OECD could at best be justifying 
short-term fiscal stimulus measures, but, by 2009, ‘ambitious’ fiscal consolidation 
measures were being advocated, which would be sufficient to bring government 
budgets close to balance or even into surplus. The higher unemployment, which was 
alleged to be mainly structural, then affirmed the need for further structural reform 
(OECD 2009: 214).  
Increasing evidence is emerging about the impact of the recession on USA growth 
potential. The USA has not been subject to the fiscal austerity measures characteristic 
of the Eurozone through the imposition of institutionalised neo-liberal policies, 
notwithstanding the ongoing political debates over the debt ceiling. A recent paper by 
Reifschneider et al. (2013), from the Federal Reserve Board, argues that, since the 
GFC at the end of 2007, discouraged unemployment in the USA has contributed to a 
decline in the participation rate to 62.8 per cent. At the same time there has been 
reduced investment in plant and machinery, which has led to a decline in productivity 
growth. Figure 1 accompanies the authors’ estimate that potential GDP is now about 
‘7 per cent below the trajectory it appeared to be on prior to 2007’ and that the annual 
growth of potential output has declined from 2.6 per cent (2000-2007) to 1.3 per cent 
(Reifschneider et al., 2013: 8). This has been accompanied by a decline in trend 
multifactor productivity. Particularly significant in the light of the OECD’s curious 
view of asymmetric hysteresis, is that the authors estimate that actual output continues 
to lie below potential output, despite the slower growth of the latter. Thus there is 
scope for output expansion, before capacity constraints starting to bind. 
While hysteresis is acknowledged, in their modelling, the short-run “natural rate” is 
restored to its long-run constant value, albeit very slowly, with the long-run rate 
having a coefficient of 0.04. Reifschneider et al., 2013:37 note: 
These dynamics are consistent with the idea that, although financial crises and 
deep recessions can have persistent effects on labor supply by disrupting labor 
market functioning, impairing unemployed workers’ skills, and causing 
premature permanent departures from the labor force, such events do not alter 
demographic conditions, the social safety net, or other fundamental 
determinants of long-run conditions in the labor market. 
The significance of this claim for modelling should not be overstated; in the light of 
the low coefficient and the rather tenuous concept of the natural rate that underpins 
their conceptual framework (see Mitchell, 1987). However, it should be noted that 
older men who lose their jobs often never return to the labour market, so demographic 
conditions do not exclusively determine the long-run estimate of the “natural rate”. 
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Figure 1: State-Space Model Estimates of the Level of US Potential GDP & its 
Components
 
Source: Reifschneider et al. (2013) Figure 1.1, Appendix. Shaded region denotes 95% confidence 
interval for estimates of potential output.  GDP measures are in billions of chained 2005 dollars. 
 
The FRB authors acknowledge that hysteresis has been a major factor in the aftermath 
of the GFC, which was not the case with previous recessions. This is significant in the 
light of the second plank of the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate, namely full 
employment. Reifschneider et al. (2013: 16) point to three potential sources of labour 
market damage “(1) difficulties in reallocating labor across different segments of the 
economy (industry, occupation, or geographic) associated with the distribution of the 
demand shock caused by the financial crisis and deep recession; (2) a more general 
deterioration in the efficiency of the matching process between available workers and 
available jobs; and (3) longterm damage in labor markets (often referred to as 
hysteresis) associated with the substantial rise in the number of long-term 
unemployed and a possible reduction in the employability of affected workers.”  
They point out that despite the impact on the supply-side, their point estimates imply 
that the level of economic slack remains quite high. They support ‘a highly 
accommodative monetary policy’, with inflationary expectations being well 
grounded, but do not rule out fiscal policy. Further ‘the case for aggressive policy is 
strengthened further by the likelihood that much of the supply-side damage is an 
endogenous response to weak aggregate demand’ (Reifschneider et al., 2013: 52). In 
contrast to the OECD (2009), the authors confirm that the hysteretic process is 
reversible. This reversibility of hysteresis was examined in Mitchell (1987). 
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To their credit, the authors do acknowledge that their analysis may overestimate the 
long-term damage that has been done. They note that ‘a substantial portion of the 
slowdown in the adjusted growth rate since 2007 reflects an unusually slow pace of 
capital deepening—a factor whose contribution to growth should pick up substantially 
over time as the recovery in business investment and the broader economy proceeds.’  
(Reifschneider et al., 2013: 8-9). 
2.3 Implications 
There is a large degree of unanimity in the heterodox theoretical literature about the 
hysteretic impact of recessions, both with respect to workers’ human capital (broadly 
defined) and the stock of productive capacity, which have implications for both the 
rate of economic recovery and the rate of inflation. Some empirical literature has also 
been canvassed to demonstrate that the severity of the post-GFC recession appears to 
have achieved an increased degree of consensus about its impact on the supply-side of 
the economy, albeit without agreement about the appropriate set of remedial policies. 
The OECD has made a major concession in conceding that major real shocks bring 
about a hysteretic process, although the assertion that the process is asymmetric seems 
dubious. We now focus on the consequences of capacity constrained unemployment 
for the achievement of sustained full employment. 
3. Fiscal space 
Full employment occurs when aggregate spending is sufficient to elicit output levels, 
which at current productivity levels will provide enough jobs (measured in working 
hours) for all the workers who desire to work. Once the non-government sector has 
determined its spending (and saving) decisions, it is the role of government fiscal and 
monetary policy to ensure that aggregate demand is appropriate. 
From the sectoral balances perspective of the national accounts, we define the non-
government sector balance as the sum of the private domestic and net exports, that is,  
(S – I) + (X – M), where S is household saving, I is private capital formation, X is 
exports and M is imports. The sectoral balances tell us that the government balance (G 
– T), where G is government spending and T is taxation revenue is equal to and of 
opposite sign to the non-government balance. 
Thus, (G – T) = (S – I) – (X – M). It is likely for many nations that the right-hand side 
(the net position for the non-government sector) will be positive. In this situation, the 
level of aggregate activity can be maintained on an on-going basis (at any rate of 
unemployment) only if G > T. That is a continuous budget deficit is required to 
sustain a given level of activity. 
It becomes obvious (and incontestable) that if the non-government spending decline 
from a given position of full employment, the only way that the spending gap can be 
filled is via a fiscal intervention – direct government spending and/or a tax cut (to 
increase private disposable income and stimulate private spending). It is possible for 
an expansionary monetary policy to reverse the decline in private spending, but the 
outcomes are much less certain relative to a fiscal expansion. 
We thus can define the full employment budget deficit condition as: 
 
(G – T) = S(Yf) + M(Yf) – I(Yf) – X 
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where Yf is the full employment national income, which is associated with 2 per cent 
unemployment and no underemployment. 
The sum of the terms S(Yf) and M(Yf) represent drains on aggregate demand when the 
economy is at full employment and the sum of the terms I(Yf) and X represents 
spending injections at full employment. If the drains outweigh the injections then for 
national income to remain stable, there has to be a budget deficit sufficient to offset 
that gap in aggregate demand. If the budget deficit is not sufficient, then national 
income will fall and full employment will be lost. 
Once we accept this reality and the fact that the government has no financial 
constraint to prevent it providing any level of deficit support to the economy, the 
debate focuses on how the required deficit should manifest itself. It is here that we 
recognise the fundamental constraint facing government – the availability of real 
goods and services for sale in the currency of issue (Mitchell and Muysken, 2008). 
Capacity-constrained unemployment refers to a state when the level of output 
associated with the full utilisation of capacity is less than Yf. 
4. Policies for sustained full employment 
4.1 Pump priming 
While Post Keynesians often fail to recognise the likely need for a currency-issuing 
government to run continuous deficits, preferring to proffer untenable fiscal rules 
such as “balancing the budget over the cycle” as a way of appeasing the mainstream, 
they do typically advocate what has been referred to as generalised fiscal and 
monetary expansion mediated by incomes policy and controlled investment as a 
solution to mass unemployment (Ramsay, 2002-3; Kadmos and O'Hara, 2000; 
Sawyer, 2003, 2005). 
Davidson (1994: 79) representing the mainstream Post Keynesian approach writes 
“Government fiscal policy is conceived as the balancing wheel, exogenously 
increasing aggregate demand whenever private sector spending falls short of a full 
employment level of effective demand and reducing demand if aggregate demand 
exceeds the full employment level.” 
However (indiscriminate) expansion in isolation is unlikely to lead to employment 
opportunities for the most disadvantaged members of society and does not incorporate 
an explicit counter-inflation mechanism, whether or not full employment is achieved. 
The assumption that the fiscal multiplier is relatively stable ignores the fact that fiscal 
policy is subject to well documented lags (Friedman, 1948), so the degree of stimulus 
required may well have changed before the planned measures have taken effect.  An 
indiscriminate expansion also fails to address the spatial labour market disparities. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2005: 967, 973) argue correctly that ‘the industrial structure of a 
region and … variations in productive capacity as well as in aggregate demand in the 
region … [drive these disparities and conclude] …  in terms of policy implications, 
appropriate demand policies are required to stimulate investment and underpin full 
employment.’  
But how can we be sure that the investment will provide jobs in failing regions 
through the provision of sufficient capacity (see also Reifschneider et al., 2013)? 
Upon what basis are the most disadvantaged workers with skills that are unlikely to 
match those required by new technologies going to be included in the ‘generalised 
expansion’ (Tcherneva, 2011)? In addition, where is the inflation anchor? Reference 
  9 
is made to the adoption of incomes policy, but the specifics are rarely spelled out. In 
particular, how are the interests of the disadvantaged going to be looked after in the 
wage fixing process? 
4.2 Spatial Keynesianism 
Mitchell and Juniper (2007) develop what they term Spatial Keynesianism to describe 
a spatially aware approach to macroeconomic policy, which includes a spatially 
targeted employment policy. Spatial Keynesianism stands in contrast to the bluntness 
of orthodox Keynesian tools, which fail to account for the spatial distribution of social 
disadvantage. 
They argue that the state can resolve demand gaps which cause unemployment in two 
ways: (a) by increasing net spending via purchasing goods and services and/or labour 
at market prices as explained in the previous sub-section; and/or (b) by using its 
currency issuance power to provide a fixed-wage job to all those who are unable to 
find a job elsewhere. This employment buffer stock approach is termed the JG (see 
Mitchell, 1998; Wray, 1998). The JG is an effective strategy for a fiat-currency 
issuing government to pursue to ensure that work is available at a liveable wage to all 
who wish to work but who cannot find market sector employment (including regular 
public sector). The government would become ‘an employer of last resort’ and 
provide a buffer stock of jobs that are available upon demand. The JG differs from a 
Keynesian expansion because it represents the minimum stimulus (the cost of hiring 
unemployed workers) required to achieve full employment rather than relying on 
market spending and multipliers. The JG also provides an inherent inflation anchor 
missing in the generalised Keynesian approach (Mitchell, 1998). Clearly, and 
emphatically, a mixture of (a) and (b) is likely to be optimal although (a) alone is not 
preferred. 
Kadmos and O’Hara (2000: 10-12) criticise the focus on government consumption of 
low-skilled services by JG advocates. They claim the leading sectors rely on 
information, knowledge, communications and networking. They advocate a boost to 
public infrastructure investment, which enhances the profitability of private sector 
investment, in addition to contributing to aggregate demand and employment. Clearly, 
if a political will exists to construct public infrastructure then employment levels will 
rise subject to real resource availability. This is independent of the need for a JG. But, 
sole reliance on public sector investment to achieve full employment, would create 
considerable economic inflexibility. The ebb and flow of the private sector would not 
be readily accommodated and an increasing likelihood of inflation would result 
(Forstater, 2000). 
Crucially, public investment is unlikely to benefit the most disadvantaged workers in 
the economy. The JG is designed to explicitly provide opportunities for them. By way 
of example, during the golden age in Australia (1945-1975) when public capital 
formation and social wage expenditure was strong, full employment was only 
achieved because the public sector (implicitly) provided an implicit JG for low skilled 
workers. This experience is shared across all advanced economies. 
Additionally, environmental constraints militate against generalised Keynesian 
expansion. JG proponents emphasise the regional dispersion of mass unemployment. 
Higher output levels are required to increase employment, but the composition of 
output remains a pivotal policy issue. JG jobs would be designed to support local 
community development and advance environmental sustainability. JG workers could 
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participate in many community-based, socially beneficial activities that have 
intergenerational payoffs, including urban renewal projects, community and personal 
care, and environmental schemes such as reforestation, sand dune stabilisation, and 
river valley and erosion control. Most of this labour intensive work requires very little 
capital equipment and training, an issue we consider in the Section 4.3 (see Mitchell, 
1998). 
4.3 Employment buffers – the Job Guarantee 
The issue of capacity constraints is often raised as an objection to the introduction of a 
JG. The government makes an unconditional offer of a job at a fixed wage to anyone 
who is seeking employment. The JG is thus demand, rather than supply, determined. 
Many critics of the scheme claim that there is not sufficient capital available to 
implement such a scheme since, in many economies, there have been high rates of 
unemployment since the GFC. First, it is necessary to establish whether there is 
capacity-constrained unemployment, which can be achieved by undertaking the 
following steps: 
1. Calculate the real output gap that is the difference between capacity based, 
potential real output and actual real output. 
2. Calculate the extra output that would be generated if the unemployed were to be re-
employed (allowing for frictional unemployment of say 2-3 per cent), subject to an 
assumption about labour productivity per capita or per hour. 
3. Compare that output with the real output gap which reflects prevailing capacity 
constraints. 
If the extra output that would be forthcoming exceeds the real output gap, then the 
economy has capacity-constrained unemployment that cannot be solved by a short-
run stimulus package but requires longer-term investment in productive capacity, 
particularly in the private sector. 
In this situation, it may be argued that the JG is incomplete or possibly unviable as a 
solution to mass unemployment because in the medium term, the JG is also subject to 
capacity-constrained unemployment. However the implementation of the JG exploits 
the spending capacity of a currency-issuing government, which is not constrained by 
expectations of future aggregate demand. This stands in contradistinction to the 
spending decisions of private firms that are guided by profitability considerations and 
constrained by endemic uncertainty. 
In other words, the JG creates its own productive capacity each time it takes on a new 
worker. Members of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE) have 
developed a detailed understanding of the types of jobs that could be created under a 
JG and research has been undertaken to establish the additional resources that would 
be required, including equipment (protective clothing etc); training resources; 
supervisory personnel; standard raw materials; and extra administrative and 
operational outlays (see Cook et al., 2008). In short, a large amount of fine-grained 
information has been assembled about the necessary resources to mount a JG program 
in Australia. Further, practical experience has also been gained through involvement 
with employment generation programs in a number of countries. There is also a 
detailed international literature on this topic that enables realistic parameters for 
capital and training costs to be utilised, after being cross-matched with the data 
gleaned from research in Australia. 
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The upshot is that we have devised three stylised JG employment categories, 
differentiated by their labour intensity and wage to non-wage costings: 
§ Low capital intensity – 75/25 rule; 
§ Medium capital intensity – 60/40 rule; and 
§ High capital intensity – 50/50 rule. 
For example, the 75/25 rule indicates that 75 per cent of total costs will be absorbed 
by wages with the remaining 25 per cent being non-labour costs, which include the 
wages of supervisors, administrative costs, materials used and capital depreciation. 
These categories can then be linked to the range of jobs that are identified to meet 
unmet community need and which would be accessible to the most unskilled workers. 
From our research, the majority of jobs that are identified as being suitable for low 
skill workers were in the low capital intensity areas of work, although this varied 
across the specific need areas (transport amenity; community welfare services; public 
health and safety; and recreation and culture). The upshot is that these capital 
requirements are grounded in the real world evidence. The currency-issuing 
government has the financial capacity to procure the required resources and would not 
face the same sort of constraints that the private sector would face in the short-run if it 
were trying to deal with a generalised expansion. The key issue for the JG is adequate 
planning, which must be informed by accurate projections to ensure these purchases 
are made in a timely manner, thereby avoiding unnecessary delays in the offer of jobs. 
The major challenge for the efficacy of the JG is in its initial implementation. For 
example, if the official unemployment rate is 5 per cent, labour underutilisation would 
be in the order of 10-12 per cent, which means that, if a 2 per cent unemployment 
(underutilisation) target is realistic, given normal labour market frictions, then a 
further 8-10 percentage points increase in total work hours can be anticipated by JG 
administrators, minus a portion of which will be taken up in due course by the private 
sector due to the resulting multiplier effects.  
This is a logistical challenge, which would require careful planning with respect to the 
provision of additional resources, as described above. There is already an 
administrative structure in place, namely Centrelink, which is now identified with the 
Department of Human Services, which is responsible for health, social and welfare 
payments (including Newstart) and services, but there should be no expectation that 
the JG could or would be introduced in a very short time frame. An integral part of 
the planning process is to ensure that these resources are availability in close 
proximity to where JG workers live. 
The ongoing test of the efficacy of the JG as a strategy for sustained full employment 
is its capacity to respond to fluctuations in non-government employment through its 
provision on demand of jobs and the necessary non-labour resources.  
In Figure 2 we show the quarterly fluctuations of the main components of real 
aggregate demand in Australia from September 1985 until June 2013. The respective 
standard deviations of non-Government expenditures are consumption (0.82); 
investment (2.81); and net exports (3.09). As would be expected, the consumption 
share of GDP is relatively stable, whereas investment and net exports are quite 
volatile, which is revealed by the respective coefficients of variation. However it 
would be expected that in a fully employed economy, the fluctuations of investment 
would diminish to the extent that it is associated with the production of non-tradeable 
goods. Likewise the presence of a JG would further stabilise consumption, by 
  12 
providing an increased certainty with respect to the receipt of income. Hence it is 
extremely unlikely that, once the JG is established, fluctuations in non-Government 
employment would impose similar organisational demands, as when the JG was 
established.  
Figure 2: Shares of real GDP of main expenditure aggregates (September 1985 - June 
2013) 
Source: RBA Statistics: Table G11, Gross Domestic Product – Expenditure Components, Authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Figure 3 Quarterly Changes in non-Government Spending as a share of Real GDP 
(December 1985 - June 2013) 
 
Source: ABS, National Accounts. 
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This is confirmed in Figure 3, which shows quarterly changes in real non-government 
spending expressed as a share of real GDP. The majority of changes lie between -1 
per cent and +1 per cent of GDP and the larger changes, in absolute terms, tend to be 
short lived. The positive changes in non-Government spending should lead to a 
seamless transfer of JG workers into the private sector to which they are attracted by 
higher hourly wages. The non-Government share of GDP fell 52 times over the nearly 
28 years of quarterly observations, of which just 9 changes exceeded 1 percentage 
point of GDP.  
Thus the major challenge to the implementation of a JG would appear to be when it is 
introduced and it is necessary to address the extant rate of labour underutilisation, but 
the Centrelink offices have extremely accurate data on the spatial distribution of job 
seekers, which will inform the deployment of non-labour resources. On the other 
hand, the ongoing maintenance of full employment through the JG would appear to be 
relatively straightforward in terms of the deployment of labour. 
Finally, an issue, which is typically raised with respect to a full employment policy, is 
whether the demand impact of the extra employment is inflationary. The buffer 
employment ratio (BER) defines a critical proportion of total jobs that are in the JG 
pool, and is associated with the stabilisation of inflation. In any modern capitalist 
economy a full employment policy must be accompanied by a counter- inflation 
policy, which, for consistency, must not rely on unemployment buffer stocks to 
generate a counter-inflation sanction. The JG relies on an income sanction, namely 
taking up a minimum wage JG job, as opposed to one attracting market wages, to 
control inflation. The comparison of the size of the BER with the NAIRU is 
meaningless, since from both an economic and social perspective, the use of an 
employment buffer stock through the JG is superior to an unemployment buffer stock 
via the adoption of pump priming. 
6. Conclusion 
While a private sector expansion may be capacity constrained, when the economy has 
been in recession, this issue does not apply to the introduction of a JG, which can be 
designed to accommodate a range of viable capital-labour ratios. Subject to adequate 
planning, the offer of a JG job simultaneously creates the extra productive capacity 
required for the viability of this program. Further, by also adopting incomes policy to 
supplement the wage sanction which is characteristic of the JG program, it would be 
possible to keep the maximum stock of JG workers relatively small, which will 
reduce the incidence of low wage employment and also the disruption to the provision 
of services by JG workers caused by fluctuations in JG employment, due to both the 
flux of non-Government employment and the imperative of stable inflation. 
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